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Abstract 
Afghanistan is severely contaminated by 
anti-personnel mines, which pose major 
physical, social and economic threats to 
repatriating refugees. Fortunately, mine 
action-+ multidimensional effort to 
address these problems through survey, 
detection, clearance, mineawareness, and 
victim assistance-is well developed in 
Afghanistan, with the AfghanMine Ac- 
tion Program a model of good practice. 
That said, mine action faces ongoing 
challenges, of which thoseoriginating in 
the realm of politics are the most trou- 
bling. 
L'Afghanistan est profondhent infestt 
de mines anti-personnelles, et ces dernii- 
res reprtsentent un danger physique, so- 
cial et tconomique majeur pour le 
rapatriementdes rtifugiks. Fort heureuse- 
men t, ce que Iron pourrait nommer l'ac- 
tion au dhinage (mine action) est trks 
bien dheluppt en Afghanistan. I1 s'agit 
d'un effort multidimensionnel visant d 
traiterce problhe par le biais de fouilles 
sur le terrain, dttection, dimination, 
conscientisation des populations faceau 
danger reprhentt! par les mines, et aide 
aux victims. Le programme d'action au 
dhinage afghan apparait comme un 
mod2ledugenre. Cependant, l'action au 
dhinage fait faced des remises en ques- 
tion importantes, au nombre desquelles 
celles se dkgageant des arcanes de la po- 
litique nesont pas les moins troublantes. 
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On the evening of 27 December 1979, 
Soviet special forces stormed the Tajbeg 
Palace in southern Kabul and killed its 
most prominent occupant, the Afghan 
President Hafizullah Amin. Almost 
immediately, they swathed the Palace 
with minefields. The Soviets, and in- 
deed the Soviet Union, are now gone, 
but their mines remain. From this grue- 
some starting point, mines were laid in 
many other parts of the country so that 
nearly two decades later, Afghanistan 
remains one of the countries most se- 
verely afflicted by this vicious form of 
late twentieth century pollution. Re- 
markable steps have been taken to ad- 
dress the problem. However, for too 
many Afghans, not least among them 
those Afghan refugees who remain 
stranded in Pakistan and Iran, the 
threat of hideous injury from landmines 
continues to thwart their hopes of retum 
to their homeland. In the following re- 
marks, I propose toexamine five topics: 
the nature of the landmine menace, 
ways of addressing the problem, the 
evolution of "mine action" in Afghani- 
stan, the achievements of the Mine Ac- 
tion Program, and the challenges which 
continue to face mine action in Afghani- 
stan. 
The Problem of Landmines 
A mine is a munition placed under, on 
or near the ground or other surface area 
which is designed to be exploded by the 
presence, proximity or contact of a per- 
son or vehicle. Mines generally fallinto 
two categories, Anti-Tank Mines 
(ATMs) and Anti-Personnel Mines 
(APMs). A neat distinction tends to 
break down when one encounters 
ATMs with anti-handling devices, 
which in practice can have similar ef- 
fects to APMs. The key feature of mines 
is that they are victim-activated, and 
this accounts for the massive concern 
which has arisen about their effects. In 
too many conflicts, including the Af- 
ghan conflict, the bulk of victims have 
been civiliannon-combatants. This has 
prompted widespread debate as to their 
legitimacy as a weapon (Human Rights 
Watch 1993; Davies 1994; McGrath 
1994;Cahill1995; Roberts and Williams 
1995; ICRC 1996). 
The effects of landmines canbe wide- 
spread and horrific. Even simple move- 
ment from one place to another can be 
fraught with danger: in April 1992, after 
the collapse of Najibullah's communist 
regime, the largest and fastest vohntary 
repatriation of refugees in UNHCR's 
history was blighted by a sharp upsurge 
in recorded mine injuries (Coupland 
1996). Mines, according to the Intema- 
tional Committee of the Red Cross, 
"have the power to deny, by their very 
presence, the fundamental right of refu- 
gees to retum to their native lands" 
(ICRC 1992, 8). Themost immediate con- 
sequences of APMs are medical, and 
vary according to whether the APMs in 
question are blast or fragmentation 
mines, with the former causing injury 
through the expansion of heated gases 
and the latter through the dispersal of 
shrapnel (ICRC 1995). An Afghan who 
treads on a blast mine may well die on 
the spot, and even if he or she survives, 
is likely to lose one orboth legs. Infection 
is a serious riskbecause of the amount of 
foreign matter that is embedded in the 
tissues of the victim (Coupland 1992). 
The need for prostheses, if victims are to 
recover mobility, points to a further 
problem: that of coping with a lifelong 
disability. Afghanistan is not a society 
well-equipped to meet the needs of the 
disabled (Miles 1990). As a result, mine 
victims are likely to suffer a disastrous 
loss of self-esteem and tolapseintoclini- 
cal depression, for which the resources 
to provide treatment are again pitifully 
inadequate. Thus, landmines have sig- 
nificant social consequences. They also 
have striking economic consequences, 
since the presence of APMs can deny the 
use of land to those who need it for ag- 
ricultural or pastoral purposes. And 
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those who feel they have no option but 
to make use of land are often taking a 
temfying risk in doing so, something 
driven home to this writer when he 
watched a shepherd lead a flock of 
sheep through a clearly-marked mine- 
field south of Kabul in June 1997. Fi- 
nally, mines are an environmental 
disaster, something which the Society 
of Afghan Volunteer Environmentalists 
(SAVE) headed by Abdul Wajid Adil 
has highlighted. 
Calculating the scale of Afghani- 
stan's landmine problem is a complex 
task. At least 38 different types of mines 
have been found in Afghanistan. On 
occasion, estimates of the number of 
mines to be found have been put for- 
ward: for example, in 1993 the UN 
suggested a total of ten million mines 
and items of unexploded ordnance 
(UNOCHA l993,2). However, the sim- 
ple number of mines in a country is a 
poor measure of the problems they 
cause, since it tells one nothing about 
the pattern of their distribution and the 
resultant human, social and economic 
effects. It is more useful to map and 
count minefields, since a minefield will 
disrupt normal life irrespective of how 
many mines it contains. Initial data be- 
came available in 1993 as a result of the 
National Survey of Mines Situation in 
Afghanistan (MCPA 1993)-2,353mine- 
fields were identified, occupying 388.75 
square kilometres, or 0.06 percent of 
Afghanistan's area. However, only 
46.21 square kilometres were desig- 
nated as requiring "high priority clear- 
ance," since many minefields were 
located onmountain tops, hillsides and 
desert--areas to which the Soviet Union 
wished to deny its opponents access for 
transit purposes, but which were not 
central to the lives of many Afghans. 
Subsequent surveys have identified fur- 
ther minefields to be cleared. In addi- 
tion, the tasks of mine action have 
expanded to cover the problem of "bat- 
tlefield area clearance," as the seden- 
tary population, returning refugees, 
and internally displaced persons in- 
creasingly encounter threats not simply 
from mines but fromunexplodedbombs 
and other ordnance leftover frombattle. 
Thus, at the beginning of 1998, it was 
concluded that 725 square kilometres of 
land remained affected by mines, with 
324 square kilometres demanding high 
priority clearance. High priority areas 
for clearance were found in the prov- 
inces of Herat (73.22 sq km), Kandahar 
(59.28 sq km), Farah (41.05 sq km), 
Paktia (33.15 sq km), Zabul (19.02 sq 
km), Kabul (18.81 sqkm), Ghazni (18.34 
sq km), Paktika (14.48 sq km), and 
Nimruz (10.73 sq km). More happily, 
in Jowzjan, Bamian and Uruzgan, no 
high priority minefields remained. 
(UNOCHA 1998a, 20). Mine clearance 
remains a substantial task. Fortunately, 
it is not significantly complicated by re- 
mining of cleared areas, of which there 
is evidence only in the Shomali Valley. 
Techniques of Mine Action 
Some years ago, talk of "mine clear- 
ance'' or "demining" was common- 
place. These terms still are useful as 
labels for particular types of activity. To 
describe the totality of steps to address 
the problem of APMs, the broader term 
"mine action" is becoming increasingly 
popular. It captures the intercon- 
nededness of the complex steps that are 
required to address a complex problem. 
Afghanistan offers an excellent exam- 
ple of a complex mine action program at 
work. Mine action incorporates five key 
elements: survey, detection, clearance, 
mine awareness training, and victim 
assistance. Prioritizing different 
spheres of mine action is'a highly con- 
tentious issue amongst professionals in 
the area, and can become a source of 
si@cant disputation if not handled 
with sensitivity. 
Suroeys of potentially mined areas are 
vital if scarce resources are to be used 
efficiently. It is at the survey stage that 
minefields are initially marked. First, it 
is necessary to undertake general sur- 
veys, to identify the areas which locals 
believe to be mined, and to idenbfy the 
use to whichmined land could be put if 
cleared. This enables priorities tobe at- 
tached to the clearance of different ar- 
eas. Thesemust be followedby technical 
surveys, in which the exact boundaries 
of minefields are traced (in Afghanistan 
by Global Positioning System methods) 
and detailed maps prepared whichcan 
be passed on to deminers. Finally, com- 
pletion surveys bring the deminingproc- 
ess to an end. 
Detection of landrnines is one of the 
most challenging technical tasks of hu- 
manitarian mine action. A very high 
level of reliability is required,'certainly 
more than in military mine clearance. In 
the latter the objective is often to breach 
a path rather than clear an entire area, 
and a higher level of casualties may be 
deemed acceptable given the intrinsic 
risks associated with war. Metal detec- 
tors are widely used. However, it canbe 
difficult to use them to detect those 
APMs, which are made largely of plastic 
and have low metallic signatures, espe- 
cially if soil has a high ferrous content. 
Metal detectors are thus being increas- 
ingly augmented by the use of dogs 
trained to detect with their sensitive 
noses the explosive charges within 
mines. A great deal of research on alter- 
native means of detection-for example, 
ground-penetrating radars, biosensors, 
and infrared detection techniques-is 
being conducted, but there is a consider- 
able gulf between what appears promis- 
ing in the hands of physicists in a 
well-equipped laboratory and what 
will prove workable in the potentially 
harsh terrain of a mine-infested Third 
World country such as Afghanistan 
where physicists are in short supply. 
Clearance for the most part is carried 
out in a laboriously manual fashion. If 
simple metal detectors arebeing used in 
the initial sweep of what is known to be 
a mined area, progress can be agoniz- 
ingly slow, since shrapnel, bullet cas- 
ings, and other detritus of battle, as well 
as scrap metal, may all give positive 
readings and require investigation. 
This typically involves a deminer with 
a prodder clearing away surrounding 
soil to reveal the precise nature of the 
object detected. In Afghanistan, stand- 
ard operating procedures require that 
mines be blown up in situ with plastic 
explosives, a procedure that allays any 
suspicion that mines arebeing lifted for 
reuse. Mechanical mine clearance vehi- 
cles using flails-which beat the earth 
in or on which mines are to be found- 
have been developed, but their utility in 
Afghanistan is limited by the nature of 
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the terrain. Battlefield clearance re- 
quires somewhat different techniques, 
since some UXOs may need tobe moved 
before they can be safely exploded. An 
old firing range at Pul-e Charkhi on the 
eastern outskirts of Kabul is used for 
such controlled detonations. 
Mine awareness is a vital activity, but 
one of the most troublesome. Poorly ex- 
ecuted or culturally-insensitive mine 
awareness training can waste scarce 
resources, and-in the worst in- 
stances-be counterproductive. Mine 
awareness training needs to be care- 
fully targeted to groups at greatest risk. 
It is also important that mine awareness 
classes not inadvertently become a 
venue to further degrade the self-esteem 
and psychosocial wellness of mine vic- 
tims. At anumber of classes in Afghani- 
stan attended by the author over the 
years, traumatized mine victims were 
forced to relive the worst experiences of 
their lives. Particular problems arise in 
Afghanistan because of the vulnerabil- 
ity of pastoral nomads, whose lifestyle 
puts them at relatively high riskbut also 
makes them inaccessible to village- 
based classes (MSF 1997,24). 
Finally, victim assistance is vital in a 
country as contaminated by APMs as 
Afghanistan. In the short term, this 
mostly involves surgery to craft from a 
smashed leg an amputation stump to 
which a prosthesis can be attached, to- 
gether with rehabilitation training to 
allow victims to recover mobility. Other 
medical treatments may also be re- 
quired, as mine injuries neednot be lim- 
ited to the limbs. In the longer-run, 
however, victim assistance involves the 
provision of work opportunities to fos- 
ter victim self-sufficiency and most fun- 
damentally of all, efforts tobreakdown 
the cognitive barriers which define the 
disabled as being of limited worth. This 
is a great concern of the Afghan Disa- 
bled Society headed by Abdul Rahman 
Sahak. None of this is easy to deliver. 
The Organization of Mine Action 
in Afghanistan 
Mine adion in Afghanistan has a vener- 
able history. During the l98Os, the prob- 
lem of APMs was one with which 
members of the staffs of non-govern- 
mental organizations (NGOs) became 
distressingly familiar. The Interna- 
tional Committee of the Red Cross oper- 
ated a surgical hospital in Peshawar to 
which many mine accident victims- 
the more fortunate ones-were trans- 
ported from ICRC clinics on the 
Pakistan-Afghanistan border. How- 
ever, concerted mine action had to await 
the signing of the Geneva Accords in 
April 1988, and more fundamentally, 
the completion of the withdrawal of 
Soviet troops from Afghanistan in Feb- 
ruary 1989. Enormous strides have been 
made in the decade since then, funda- 
mentally because of the wisdom with 
which the program was initiated. Since 
contest for control of the state in Af- 
ghanistan persisted (Saikal and Maley 
1991; Maley 1997), it was necessary to 
develop a model for mine action inde- 
pendent of Kabul-based bureaucracies. 
An initialexperiment with camp-based 
training of villagers proved a failure: 
tools were sold in local markets, and 
documentation of both mine incidents 
and program achievements was poor 
(Eaton, Horwood, and Niland 1997,12- 
13). It was clear that mine action had to 
be put on a thoroughly professional 
footing. The model which was then 
adopted provided for mine action to be 
substantially undertaken by Afghan 
NGOs created for the purpose, but un- 
der the organizationalumbrellaof what 
was tobecome the United Nations Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Assistance to Afghanistan (UNOCHA). 
This framework remains in place, and 
has been an outstanding success. 
The UNOCHA Mine Action Program 
for Afghanistan (MAPA) thus has a 
number of discrete elements. Its man- 
agement heart is the UNOCHA Mine 
Actioncentre for Afghmtan (MACA), 
based in Islamabad, Pakistan, with re- 
gional offices in Kabul, Jalalabad, 
Kandahar and Heart. MACA's head- 
quarters are under the supervision of a 
Program Manager. In recent years, the 
position of Program Manager has been 
occupied by a succession of retired offic- 
ers from the Australian Army who had 
earlier served in the area during the de- 
ployment from 1989 to 1993 of an Aus- 
tralian Army contingent that was 
attached to the UN program to provide 
technical advice and training to Afghan 
staff (Maley 1994). The implementation 
of the work of MAPA is in the hands of 
a range of NGOs, the majority of them 
Afghan; around 3,900 Afghans are em- 
ployed by the program. Survey work is 
largely the responsibility of the Mine 
Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA). 
The bulk of actual detection and clear- 
ance is done by Afghan Technical 
Consultants (ATC), the Mine Detection 
Dog Centre (MDC), the Demining 
Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA), the 
Organization for Mine Clearance and 
Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR), and 
the HALO Trust, which is a British char- 
ity. Awareness training is undertaken 
by OMAR, together with Handicap 
International (HI), Save the Children 
USA, the Afghan Red Crescent Society, 
and-in one of the most imaginative 
elements of the program-the BBC 
Drama Project (AEDP). The project con- 
veys mine awareness messages through 
the medium of a soap opera, New Home, 
New Life, which is specially designed to 
convey usefulinformation through dra- 
matic form on short-wave radio. Victim 
assistance is amajor activity of the Inter- 
national Committee of the Red Cross, 
which provides surgical facilities and 
runs world-renowned orthopaedic re- 
habilitation centres (Ignatisff 1998, 
153-56). 
The program is funded by voluntary 
donations, with Sweden, the USA, the 
Netherlands, Germany, Japan, the 
United Kingdom, and the European 
Union being notably generous con- 
tributors. MAPA-in contrast to some 
other areas of activity for which the UN 
has sought funding through its annual 
Consolidated Appeal-has been rela- 
tively well funded. For each of the last 
six years, over U.S.$l5 million has been 
subscribed to support MAPA's work, 
and by mid-1998, U.S.$16,182,234 had 
been received or pledged for work dur- 
ing the current year (UNOCHA 1998b, 
8). However, this still fell short of the 
Appeal target of U.S.$23,985,000. 
Achievements 
What have been the main achievements 
of MAPA? They fall, I would argue, into 
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three categories. The first relates to the 
concrete work of the program in 
Afghanistan. The second relates to the 
unintended consequences of the 
program in Afghanistan. The third re- 
lates to the contribution of the program 
to the broad river of world opinion 
whichculminated inDecember 1997 in 
the signing of the Convention on the Pro- 
hibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production 
and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and 
on their Destruction, known as the Ot- 
tawaTreaty, which willcome intoeffect 
in March 1999. 
The concrete achievements of the pro- 
gram are considerable. As of November 
1997,184 square kilometres of mined 
land had been surveyed, mapped, and 
marked, 130 square kilometres of high 
priority mined land had been cleared, 
and 122 square kilometres of former 
battlefield land had been cleared of 
UXOs. In the process, 686,813 mines 
and UXOs hadbeendestroyed. In addi- 
tion, 3,863,377 Afghans had received 
mine awareness training. The program 
is also an efficient one: 1995-96 figures 
suggested an average clearance cost for 
manual teams of U.S.$l per square me- 
tre, which were "the lowest reported 
from any country" (Eaton, Horwood, 
andNiland 1997,39). One of the factors 
which has contributed to the efficiency 
of the program has been its exposure to 
a number of rigorous external evalua- 
tions, which have permitted sigruficant 
gains to be made in both productivity 
and safety. This experience has high- 
lighted an often-overlooked point of 
considerable importance-that much 
can be gained through improvement in 
management structures and tech- 
niques. Mine action is very much a hu- 
man and social phenomenon, and 
while technological innovations can 
improve programefficiency, they areby 
no means the only way of lifting per- 
formance. 
In addition to these achievements, 
MAPA has had a number of valuable 
unintended consequences. Perhaps 
most importantly, it has provided a 
venue in which Afghans of widely dif- 
fering backgrounds can come together 
to further a cause which is universally 
recognized to be a beneficial one. 
Demhers are highly esteemed, and they 
have the opportunity to re-learn a 
number of sociopolitical skills which 
years of ferocious war tend to under- 
mine. These include the skills of trusting 
and cooperating across ethnic lines. As 
ethnic tensions have sharpened in Af- 
ghanistan (Saikal l%8), the importance 
of mine action as a neutral venue for 
cooperation has increased. MAPA has 
also provided an example of what Af- 
ghan NGOs are capable of achieving. 
Apart from the Afghan Red Crescent 
Society, founded in 1934, NGOs were 
virtually unknown to Afghanistan un- 
til the years following the Soviet inva- 
sion. Following the Soviet withdrawal, 
the relative flood of money for recon- 
struction programs triggered a high 
level of rent seeking from Afghans. 
NGOs of dubious provenance emerged, 
which often amounted to no more than 
family networks fronted by polished 
salesmen operating out of briefcases. 
While the mine action NGOs have not 
been entirely free of informalnetwork- 
ing-which can pervade almost any 
formal organization-they have none- 
theless performed in a highly profes- 
sional manner. At some point in the 
future, they may provide a prototype for 
further forms of autonomous social or- 
ganization in Afghanistan. Finally, the 
mine action NGOs have nurtured some 
bright talent developed in exile by 
younger Afghans whomake up the tech- 
nocratic stratum. At some point, the 
country willneed their talent to exploit 
more widely for purposes of postwar 
reconstruction. 
Mine action in Afghanistan has been 
brought to the attention of the wider 
world through the activities of the Af- 
ghan Campaign to Ban Landmines 
(ACBL), which was founded in August 
1995. The Afghan Campaign is chaired 
by Sayed Aqa, who is also the Director of 
MCPA. The ACBL hasbeen an energetic 
member of the International Campaign 
to Ban Landmines (ICBL), which in 
1997 was jointly awarded the Nobel 
Peace Prize. Since its establishment, the 
ACBL has gathered over 240,000 peti- 
tions calling for a total ban on 
landmines (ACBL 1998,l). Throughits 
work, ACBL has directly linked Af- 
ghanistan to the remarkable process, 
which resulted in the conclusion of the 
Ottawa Treaty (see Thakur 1998; Eng- 
lish 1998; Price 1998). The Ottawa 
Treaty is not a magic solution to the 
landmines problem, but constitutes a 
powerful statement of moral revulsion 
against this particular weapon and has 
undoubtedly fostered a climate in 
which resources for mine action are 
more likely to be forthcoming. The 
United States's "Demining 2010" ini- 
tiative may be one positive spin-off from 
the Ottawa process, since the US, while 
refusing to sign the treaty itself, has been 
keen to demonstrate to doubters that it 
remains committed to the cause of mine 
action. In the context of the Ottawaproc- 
ess, the ACBL has played a vital role in 
ensuring that the particular needs of 
Afghanistan are not drowned out by the 
clamour of the wider world. 
Challenges 
Mine action nonetheless faces anumber 
of serious challenges. The times in 
which we are living are not easy ones for 
any kind of humanitarian action in Af- 
ghanistan, and illustrate how complex 
is the interplay between politics and 
humanitarianism. The rise of the 
Taliban movement (see Maley 1998), 
while at heart a product of Pakistani 
military strategy, has created major 
problems for both the United Nations 
and Western and Afghan NGOs. The 
Taliban are unquestionably the world's 
least feminist movement. While their 
persecution of women (PHR 1998) has 
not impacted directly on mine clear- 
ance, since it is a gender neutral activity, 
it has affected mine awareness training 
in some areas. More generally, it haspoi- 
soned the climate for UN and NGO ac- 
tivity in Afghanistan. 
The consequent disruptions in UN 
activities have struckMAPAas well. At 
the end of September 1997, the Head of 
the MAPA office in Kandahar, together 
with two other officials, was expelledby 
the Taliban after he "walked out of a 
meeting in protest after a female col- 
league was told to address the assem- 
bled company from behind a screen" 
(UNOCHA 1997,l). On23March 1998, 
the UN ordered the withdrawal of all its 
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expatriate staff from Kandahar follow- 
ing a physical assault on an expatriate 
staffer by the Taliban governor 
(Hussain 1998). This suspension of ac- 
tivities lowered MAPA's rate of clear- 
ance for the first half of 1998 (UNOCHA 
1998b, 9). In May 1998, a UN delegation 
visited Kabul to negotiate terms for re- 
engagement, but the concession it made 
in Article 13 of its Memorandum of 
Understanding with the Taliban that 
"women's access to and participation 
in health and education will need to be 
gradual" not only provoked a storm of 
protest from NGOs, but arguably en- 
couraged the Taliban to make their sub- 
sequent demand that Western NGOs 
shift to the derelict Polytechnic complex. 
Most NGOs rightly interpreted this de- 
mand as a covert expulsion order that 
prevented any large-scale UN re-en- 
gagement from taking place. The depar- 
ture of the NGOs was accompanied by 
Taliban theft of equipment, notably ve- 
hicles provided to the Sandy Gall Af- 
ghanistan Appeal by the Princess 
Diana Memorial Fund. As Agence France 
Presse reported on 24 July, the "two 
Diana memorial fund Land Rovers now 
ferry around turbaned and gun-toting 
passengers in comfort through the 
bumpy and potholed streets of Kabul." 
Finally, the murder in Kabul on 21 Au- 
gust 1998 of Lieutenant Colonel Car- 
mine Calo, an Italian officer attached to 
the UN Special Mission to Afghanistan, 
prompted the withdrawal from Kabul of 
all expatriate UN staff including the 
Head of the MAPA office. It is likely tobe 
some time before conditions permit the 
reintroduction of any significant expa- 
triate presence. 
There is one further challenge to be 
met. Afghanistan, despite being seri- 
ously afflicted by the scourge of APMs, 
is yet to sign the Ottawa Treaty. This 
may become a practical problem for 
MAPA should donors at some point 
decide to make it a condition of assist- 
ance that the state soliciting aid be a 
state party to the Convention. However, 
it is also regrettable from a symbolic 
point of view. The victims of mines in 
Afghanistan are overwhelmingly Af- 
ghan, and if the country's political lead- 
ers cannot come together to renounce a 
weapon by which their own people 
have been so hideously scarred, it 
speaks poorly of their claims to popular 
legitimacy. 
References 
Afghan Campaign to Ban Landmines (ACBL). 
1998. "240,000 Afghans Support a Total 
Ban on Anti-Personnel Landmines." Ban 
Landmines 3,l. 
Cahill, Kevin M., ed.  1995. Clearing the Fields: 
Solutions to the Global Land Mines Crisis. 
New York: Basic Books. 
Coupland, R. M. 1992. Amputation for War 
Wounds. Geneva: International Co~llIILittee 
of the Red Cross. 
Coupland, R. M. 1996. "The effects of weap- 
ons: surgical challenge and medical di- 
lemma." Journal of the Royal College of 
Surgeons of Edinburgh 41,65-71. 
Davies, Paul. 1994. WaroftheMines: Cambodia, 
Landmines and the Impoverishment of a Na- 
tion. London: Pluto Press. 
Eaton, Robert, Chris Horwood, and Norah 
Niland. 1997. Afghanistan: The Develop- 
ment of Indigenous Mine Action Capacities. 
New York: Lessons Learned Unit, Depart- 
ment of Humanitarian Affairs, United 
Nations. 
English, John. 1998. "The Ottawa Process: 
Paths Followed, Paths Ahead. "Australian 
Journal of International Afiirs 52,121-32. 
Human Rights Watch. 1993. Landmines: A 
Deadly Legacy. New York: Human Rights 
Watch. 
Hussain, Zahid. 1998. "UN forced out of 
Kandahar." The Times, 25 March. 
Ignatieff, Michael. 1998. The Warrior's Honor: 
Ethnic War and theModern Conscience. Lon- 
don: Chatto & Windus. 
International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC). 1992.Mines:A Perverse UseofTech- 
nology. Geneva: ICRC. 
- 1995. The WorldwideEpidemicofLandmine 
Injuries. Geneva: ICRC. 
- 1996. Anti-Personnel Landmines: Friend or 
Foe? Geneva: ICRC. 
Maley, William. 1994. "Australia and Mine 
Clearance in Afghanistan." Dealing with 
Mines: Strategiesfor Peacekeepers, Aid Agen- 
ciesand thelnternational Community,edited 
by William Maley, 63-75. Canberra: Aus- 
tralian Defence Studies Centre. 
- 1997. "The Dynamics of Regime Transi- 
tionin Afghanistan." Central Asian Survey 
no. 16, 167-84. 
Maley, William, ed. 1998. Fundamentalism Re- 
born?: Afghanistan and the Taliban. New 
York: New YorkUniversity Press. 
McGrath, Rae. 1994. Landmines: Legacy of Con- 
flict. Oxford: Oxfam Publications. 
Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA). 
1993. Report of the National Survey ofMines 
Situation: Afghanistan. Vols. 1-11. 
Islamabad: MCPA. 
Miles, Michael 1990. "Disability and Afghan 
Reconstruction: some policy issues." Dis- 
ability, Handicap 8 Society no. 5,257-67. 
Mkdecins Sans Frontieres (MSF). 1997. Living 
in a Minefild: A Report on the Mine Problem 
in Afghanistan. Paris: Mkdecins Sans 
Front ih .  
Physicians for HumanRights (PHR). 1998. The 
Taliban's War on Women: A Health and Hu- 
man Rights Crisis in Afghanistan. Boston: 
PHR 
Price, Richard. 1998. "Reversing the Gun 
Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets 
Landmines." International Organization 52, 
613-44. 
Roberts, Shaun, and Jody Williams. 1995. After 
the Guns Fall Silent: The Enduring Legacy of 
Landmines. Washington DC: VietnamVet- 
erans of America Foundation. 
Saikal, Arnin, and William Maley. 1991. Re- 
gime Change in Afghanistan: Foreign Inter- 
vention and the Politics of Legitimacy. 
Boulder: Westview Press. 
Saikal, Amin, 1998. "Afghanistan's Ethnic 
Conflict." Suruival 40, 114-26. 
Thakur, Ramesh. 1998. "Anti-Personnel 
Landmines." Pacflca Review 10,6148. 
United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan 
(UNOCHA). 1993. Afghanistan: Mine 
Clearance Programmefor 1993. Islamabad: 
UNOCHA. 
- . 1997. Humanitarian Assistance for Af- 
ghanistan: Weekly Update No. 234. 
Islamabad: UNOCHA. 
- . 1998a. Afghanistan: Mine Action Pro- 
gramme Workplan 1998. Islamabad: 
UNOCHA. 
- 1998b. Afghanistan: Mid-Term Review of 
the 1998 Consolidated Appeal. Islamabad: 
UNOCHA. o 
16 Refuge, Vol. 17, No. 4 (October 1998) 
